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ABSTRACT 
Global terrorist networks are dependent on receiving financial support from a variety 
of sources, including individuals, charities and corporations. Also known as terrorist 
financing, the potential of terrorism finance to resemble a global threat has been 
recognised and also its closeness to other international crimes such as money laundering 
and organized crime. As a result, possible responses have to constitute co-ordinated, 
multi-lateral and multi faceted actions under the umbrella of a wide range of 
international stakeholders such as the United Nations Security Council and the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Combating terrorism requires a ‘holistic’ 
approach which allows for a mix of possible responses. Besides “kinetic” security 
operations (such as targeted killings) and the adoption of criminal prosecution measures 
another possible response could be the use of US styled transnational civil litigation by 
victims of terrorism against both, terrorist groups and their sponsors. Corporations, 
both profit and non profit, such as banks and other legal entities, as well as individuals, 
are often complicit in international terrorism in a role of aiders and abettors by 
providing financial assistance to the perpetrators (cf. UN Al-Qaida Sanctions List:  The 
List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to individuals, groups, 
undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida). Such collusion in acts of 
terrorism gains additional importance against the background of so called “Hybrid 
Threats”,1 NATO’s new concept of identifying and countering new threats arising from 
multi-level threat scenarios. This article discusses the potential impact of US terrorism 
lawsuits for the global fight against terrorism. 
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1
 NATO describes these as Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously 
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives – NATO has 
identified this threat and established a concept framework (MCCHT) which aims at identifying a wider 
comprehensive multi stakeholder response, see NATO CHT Experiment at 
http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/archive/42-news-stories/618-successful-countering-hybrid-threats-
experiment-in-estonia. The author took part in these experiments in May and November 2011as a NATO Rule 
of Law Subject Matter Expert (SME).  
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This article reflects on the idea of US anti terrorism litigation and how it could be used 
against corporate aiders and abettors of international terrorism. It further reflects on the 
sources, rationale, potential and shortcomings of US anti-terrorism litigation. 
Recommendations are made on how US styled anti-terrorism litigation could be used more 
effectively.  The article  shows how the notion of corporate human rights responsibility, 
which became recognised in the USA in the context of the so called “historical justice claims 
litigation”,2 developed and how it is applied in the context of terrorism litigation against 
corporate aiders and abettors of terrorism. It further explores the desirability and feasibility of 
subjecting these non state actors to transnational human rights litigation. It investigates, 
reflects and expands upon the following: the scope and nature of US Terrorism Litigation as 
established under the US Alien Torts Statute (ATS, also referred to as the ATCA), the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) and the Anti Terrorism Act (ATA). This overview is followed by a brief 
reflection on the potential role of US lawsuits against aiders and abettors of terrorist activities 
against selected countries such as Israel and the USA. It concludes with a discussion of some 
notable limitations and challenges to the effective use of US civil litigation as an 
antiterrorism deterrent.  
 
1.  The Nature and Rationale of US Terrorism Litigation 
Terrorism as a threat to our (Western) way of life and our personal security was highlighted 
by the  ‘9/11’ terror attacks against the USA, as well as the London ‘7/7’ attacks. Such acts of 
terrorism are, however, neither new nor unique: the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ from 1963 to 
1985, the well publicized Palestinian terror attacks of the 1970ies (executed mostly by PLO 
and PLFP cadres) and Libyan sponsored terror acts in the 1980ies are just some examples. 
But it had to take al-Qaeda’s “9/11” 3 to galvanize the world’s focus and attention more.4 
 
The right of a sovereign State to resort to counterterrorism measures, deemed necessary to 
counter terrorist threats derives directly from its duty to protect the life of its citizens and its 
                                                           
2
 B Stephens, International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008) at 23-
24 
3
 The term refers to the infamous attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, 
by terrorists of the Al-Qaeda network, which cost the lives of some 3000 people lost their lives. Cf. McGoldrick 
From “9-11” to the Iraq War 2003 (2004) 9-11. 
4
 See “Global Reach” for an overview of al-Qaeda attacks outside the theatres of war in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
The Economist, 7 May 2011, at 24. 
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sovereignty from such threats.5 The use of kinetic/lethal6 means (in addition to criminal 
justice responses) can sometimes successfully be applied for disrupting terrorist structures 
and capabilities (albeit often causing controversy, as the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 
has shown). Yet, such lethal measures are often criticised for being non – compatible with 
international and regional human rights law (as established under the UN Charter, its treaty-
based procedures as well as regional human rights instruments).7  
 
Israel, for example, has suffered under various forms of terrorist activities since its 
independence in 1948. Its response was the adoption of a holistic mix of “countermeasures”: 
kinetic combat operations and lethal security operations in the form of “targeted killing 
operations”, criminal prosecutions and the use of US civil litigation in what has become 
known as “Bankrupting of Terrorism“8 litigation, which is directed against funders and 
abettors of terrorism. Following this Israeli experience and example, it is submitted that any 
future successful strategy to counter terrorism should not be based upon one single approach 
alone but upon a holistic, interdisciplinary approach including various responses within their 
respective legal frameworks and participating stakeholders is needed.  
 
The present debate in the UK about the treatment of Abu Qatada, who despite constituting a 
potential security risk to the UK, cannot be deported to Jordan to stand trial for terrorism 
charges, highlights the dilemma when Human Rights are used to counter anti terrorism 
measures.9 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stopped his extradition to Jordan 
on the grounds that he may face an unfair trial there with the possibility of evidence being 
used which had been obtained by torture. An attempt of the UK government to deport him 
after having secured a memorandum of understanding from the Jordanian government 
                                                           
5See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact sheet No 32 Human Rights, 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf (last 
visited at 20-04-2012). 
6 Kinetic operations refer to combat operations with the purpose of “eliminating” terrorist cells and structures, 
lethal operations such as “targeted killing” falls within the wider ambit of that terminology, see Bachmann and 
Haeussler “Targeted Killing As A Means of Asymmetric Warfare: A Provocative View And Invitation to 
Debate” in 1 Law, Crime and History (2011) 9 – 15 on the legality of such operations  and R Bergman  “Killing 
Terror Leaders: Israel’s Experience” The Wall Street Journal 6-8 May 2011. 
7
 Bachmann and Hauessler (n 6) on the legality of kinetic targeted killing operations and Bachmann and Galvin 
“Pre-trial detention and control orders under British Anti-Terror Legislation post 9/11: Balancing a Need for 
Security with the European Convention on Human Rights – an Overview”, in 28 Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice (2010), 185 – 208 for a legal assessment of the present state of UK human rights. 
8
 Term used by the Tel Aviv based Shurat HaDin Israel Law Center to describe terrorism litigation lawsuits, see 
http://www.israellawcenter.org/.. 
9
 BBC News UK, “Abu Qatada release from Long Lartin jail prompts debate”, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17012448 (last visited 12-11- 2011). 
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blocking the use of such evidence was foiled due to an appeal to the ECtHR by the legal 
representatives of Qatada.10 
 
 Civil litigation against terrorists and their accomplices could have the potential to create 
additional deterrence in such instances. The correlation between terrorism and terrorist 
financing has been acknowledged in the United Kingdom: Part 1 of the Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Act 2010 authorises the HM Treasury to freeze terrorist assets and/or restrict access 
to terrorist funds and assets.11This UK approach follows other examples, set by the UN as 
well as the EU, when establishing anti terrorism and terrorist financing regimes.12 The next 
step would be the use of civil litigation by victims of terrorism against terrorist perpetrators 
here in the UK. In such cases, a lower standard of proof than in criminal matters would make 
the success of such a potential civil litigation case more likely: the “beyond reasonable 
doubt” standard of a criminal case is replaced with the “balance of probabilities” test in a 
civil proceeding. It is highly hypothetical at the time of writing this article whether we will 
see a plethora of such cases being heard here in the UK. However, there are recent judicial 
developments which make such a scenario not completely unlikely. In 2011, Kenyan victims 
of UK’s counter insurgency measures during the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya during the 
1950’s, won the right to proceed in their quest to sue the British government.13 While such a 
future case would have the government as a defendant and not a terrorist or corporate 
accomplice, it shows nevertheless the potential justiciability of international law violations.   
Time will tell whether such litigation can be extended from human rights violations to acts of 
terrorism and to non-state actors as defendants.  
 
US styled transnational human rights litigation  against the corporate aider and abettor of 
terrorist activities may possibly constitute such an additional element of a holistic anti-
terrorism strategy. Such Terrorism Litigation is being used  against the corporate and 
individual financial aider and abettor of international terrorism. So called “Bankrupting [of] 
Terrorism“ lawsuits refer to civil litigation directed against "funding" activities such as direct 
payments to terrorist groups and other forms of aiding and abetting such as the provision of 
material support. Its rationale is based on the assumption of an alleged “indirect” or 
                                                           
10
 BBC News UK, Abu Qatada Timeline”, http://www.b bc.co.uk/news/uk-17769990 (last visited 12-04-2012). 
11
 Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010, (c. 38), of 17.12.2010. 
12
 See e.g. UN SC Res 1373 of 28.09.2001 and EU Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27.12.2001. 
13
 See Ndiku Mutua and others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2011] EWHC 1913 (QB); O Bowcott 
“Mau Mau torture claim Kenyans win right to sue British government”, The Guardian, 21 July 2011, retrievable 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/21/mau-mau-torture-kenyans-compensation. 
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secondary liability of the corporate actors. The focus is on the activities of corporations such 
as banks (see the Arab Bank case)14, NGOs and religious charity organizations for example  
the Saudi based Islamic Relief Organization) within their respective litigation context such as 
the case of Boim v Quranic Literacy)15.  
 
Corporate collusion in international crimes and human rights violations warrants a dual 
accountability approach which can be both criminal as well as civil: it is submitted that 
international torts very often constitute international crimes as well. The so called ‘core 
crimes’16 or ‘serious international crimes’17 also constitute ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.18 This terminology follows closely the 
definition in human rights law of ‘gross violations’ and highlights the grave character of 
offences, which constitute in their intensity and impact a violation of the jus cogens 
principles of international law.19 For the purpose of this article, it is important to recognize 
such breaches, as well as acts of international terrorism, as constituting both ‘international 
crimes’ and torts/delicts.20   
 
US anti- terrorism lawsuits strike at the heart of aiding and abetting international terrorism. 
Such aiding complicity in acts of terrorism qualifies as indirect corporate accountability, 
which falls within the wider research context of corporate complicity in the commission of 
grave human rights abuses and the already established use of civil litigation as a possible 
deterrent. The article acknowledges the interdependence of the different responses to 
terrorism and argues for the adoption of a holistic approach to combat international terrorism. 
This discussion takes place before the backdrop of the present case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
                                                           
14
 Arab Bank I, 384 F.Supp. 2d 580 
15
 Boim v Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 -1003 (7th Cir.2002), also referred to as Boim I which 
targeted organizations for their financial support of Hamas. 
16
 J.F.Murphy ‘Civil liability for the commission of international crimes as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution’ 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1999) at 6. 
17
 The ‘Princeton principles on universal jurisdiction’ (2001) retrievable at  http://  
www1.umn.edu/humarts.instree/princeton.html  refer to this category of crimes as ‘serious crimes under 
international law’, Principle 2(1), and add to the four above-listed crimes piracy, slavery and torture. See further 
Ratner & Abrams Accountability for human rights atrocities in international law: beyond the Nuremberg legacy 
(2001) 162 with additional sources.  
18
 As codified in art 5(1) of the ICC Statute and arts 16-18 and 20 of the 1996 ILC’s draft code. Note that the 
crime of aggression, as the offence most recently codified under international criminal law, still remains an 
undefined concept. 
19
 Cf, ‘Commentaries to the draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts’, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, at 285. 
20 
 Ibid. The draft articles of the ILC on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts do not recognise 
‘any distinction between State “crimes” and “delict”’. 
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Petroleum before the US Supreme Court which has the potential to determine the future of 
civil litigation in the USA in cases where the alleged violations of international law are 
committed outside the territory of the USA.21 US terrorism litigation before US Federal 
Courts, using US federal law to establish subject matter jurisdiction can constitute an 
additional form of accountability for corporate (and individual) perpetrators and accomplices 
of human rights violations. US litigation can probably complement (but never replace) other 
existing forms of accountability, such as State responsibility for a breach of a human rights 
treaty obligation or individual criminal responsibility before an international forum of 
international criminal law, such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
 
2.  Corporate Human Rights Responsibility as a Legal Precursor to Corporate Civil 
Litigation  
In the context of discussing civil litigation against international terrorism it is important to 
expand on the evolving notion of corporate responsibility for Human Rights violations as a 
legal precursor to such litigation. The notion of Human Rights Responsibility reflects on the 
idea of corporations being active bearers of Human Rights duties and the potential they have 
to be Human Rights perpetrators. 
 
The growing role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the context of transnational 
business activities over the last 50 years22 has also led to an increase in reports of alleged 
corporate collusion in gross human rights atrocities, which were either committed by state 
organs of a repressive state, militia or paramilitary groups.23 Subsequently, well publicized 
                                                           
21
 The case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 
17, 2010) has the potential to limit the scope of such litigation to individual perpetrators only and exclude 
lawsuits directed against corporate colluders and indirect actors. The US Supreme Court is hearing the case as of 
the time of writing of this article as Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491 (argued 28 February 2012) 
(SCOTUS).  
22
 P Blumberg, ‘Asserting human rights against multinational corporations under United States law: Conceptual 
and procedural problems’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law, at 493. “In the modern global 
economy, the largest corporations conduct worldwide operations. They operate in the form of multinational 
corporate groups organized in “incredibly complex” multi-tiered corporate structures consisting of a dominant 
parent corporation, sub holding companies, and scores or hundreds of subservient subsidiaries scattered around 
the world. The 1999 World Investment Report estimated that there are almost 60,000 multinational corporate 
groups with more than 500,000 foreign subsidiaries and affiliates”   
23
 See e.g. O. De Schutter Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland, 
OR 2006); A Ramasastry and R Thompson, ‘Commerce, crime and conflict – Legal Remedies for Private Sector 
Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law’, (Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies 2006), 
retrievable at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf (last accessed at 28-09-2011) Appendix A, 29ff (last 
accessed at 28-09-2011). 
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transnational human rights lawsuits before US federal courts took place.24 Whilst these 
lawsuits were directly linked to corporate business conduct in the developing world (with a 
particular focus on exploitation industries) and often fall within the wider scope of the above 
mentioned “historical justice claims” litigation such as the two Holocaust lawsuits and the 
still ongoing Apartheid case, other examples of corporate collusion in present day human 
rights violations followed: that of corporate responsibility for acts of international terrorism, 
most notably since “9/11”.  
 
The United Nations recognized this potential correlation between MNCs’ business operations 
and the potential for human rights violations. A general notion has emerged at the 
international level that corporate human rights violations can lead to corporate accountability 
with the possibility of victims’ rights to redress, including a financial remedy and reparation25 
Non-binding rules on good corporate conduct26 such as the Draft Norms on the  
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights27 of 2003 serve as an example. These rules represent a future set of non-
voluntary norms for corporations. Despite being adopted by the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, they failed to be recognised  by its main organ, 
the now abolished UN Human Rights Commission (as the predecessor to the Human Rights 
Council was known until 2006). The general response to these norms was contentious and 
they were even labelled  as “exaggerated claims and conceptual ambiguities”.28  
 
Since 2006, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Harvard professor 
Ruggie, has been working to transform the rather vague policy framework of “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” of the UN into binding principles of “Business and Human rights”. 
The final product, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework came into force in 2011. This 
                                                           
24
 Cf John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708; for an overview see B Stephens, et al. (n 2). 
25
  Ibid and UN News “Corporate Law Firms Join UN-led Initiative on Business and Human Rights”, 28 January 
2009 at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29693&Cr=business&Cr1=Human+rights.  
26
  See e.g. guidelines on good corporate practice and corporate social responsibility as listed at the University of 
Minnesota’s Human Rights Library, retrievable at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/codes.html. 
27
  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). See Martin-Ortega, “Business and Human Rights 
inConflict” in 22.3 Ethics & International Affairs 2008, 273-283. 
28
  Ruggie in his initial 2006 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2006/97. 
 8 
 
framework makes detailed recommendations to corporations for respecting human rights, 
pending their eventual implementation by states signatory to these principles. 29 
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that while there exists an evolving notion of corporate Human 
Rights responsibilities at the international level, there is no regime of hard law and possible 
enforcement mechanisms yet in place.  
 
3.  Corporate Criminal Responsibility: an insufficient deterrence to corporate 
aiders and abettors of terrorism  
At the heart of this paper lays the recognition that an obvious lack of corporate responsibility 
in the context of human rights, international crimes and terrorism does exist. The successful 
prosecution of German Nazi industrialists before US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg for 
their complicity in the Holocaust (and other war crimes) during World War II30 remains the 
only judicial example where the direct complicity of corporations in the commission of 
human rights atrocities resulted in criminal prosecution and subsequent punishment of 
individuals. 
  
In essence, Nuremberg addressed the criminal responsibility of individuals in their capacity 
as officers of a corporation, acting on behalf of and as agents of it31and summarized in the 
dictum of US v Goering: 
 
“When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him [Hitler] their cooperation, they made 
themselves parties to the plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent […]”32 
 
Nonetheless, Nuremberg failed to indict German corporations as legal persons as such for 
their complicity in the Shoa/ Holocaust and the commission of war crimes, by failing to 
                                                           
29
  UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 of 21 March 2011; for the full text of the Guiding Principles, see UN Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie  - Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework at 
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf (last visited Jul 12, 2011).  
30
  See e.g. U.S. v. Friedrich Flick in VI Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
Under Control Council Law No.10 (1952), 1217, 1222, U.S. v. Alfred Krupp in Vol. X Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals (1949) 130-159 as well as the so called Zyklon B case, Bruno Tesch and others, before the 
British Military Court at Hamburg I Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1947) 93 – 103  
31
 Zyklon B case, Bruno Tesch and others, supra as an example for individual criminal responsibility for aiding 
and abetting activities as an industrialist, I Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1947) 93 – 103.  
32  See US v Goering in The Nuremberg Trials, 6 F.R.D (1946) 69, 112. 
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classify these firms as criminal organizations per se. Such a criminalisation would have made 
any individual association (such as being employed in a leadership role as director or office 
etc) with one of these companies a crime in its own name, comparable to membership in the 
SS as stipulated in Articles 9-11 of the Nuremberg Charter.33 In hindsight, this omission was 
a missed chance to establish the principle of corporate criminal responsibility at Nuremberg 
and later to link it to the “Nuremberg Principles” of 1950.34 This missed opportunity to 
expand the scope of criminal accountability post- 1950 was prolonged by the UN in its two 
ad hoc responses to the Yugoslav and Rwandese human rights abuses in the mid-1990ies. 
Neither the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) nor the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had the mandate to prosecute business 
entities as the perpetrators (or accessories) of gross human rights violations. The new 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague also fails to prosecute such corporate 
crimes under its Statute, the Rome Statute of the ICC. The only exception hereto is possible 
prosecution of corporate officers using the aiding and abetting responsibility test as set forth 
in Article 25 (3) of the ICC Statute.35  
 
To date there is no recognition under international law of an independent principle of 
corporate criminal responsibility for the commission of gross human rights atrocities and 
terrorism.36 To make matters worse, there are only few domestic provisions for the criminal 
prosecution of business entities.37 This failure and perhaps even deliberate oversight in 
closing a ‘legal black hole’ of corporate criminal accountability made it necessary to expand 
other forms of corporate accountability, such as civil responsibility or accountability.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
33
 As supplement and extension to the criminalization of certain Nazi organizations such as the Leadership of 
the Nazi Party and the SS under Article 9 Nuremberg Charter, see Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for 
International Crimes, OUP (2003) at 139. 
34 The seven “Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal” were published in United Nations 2 International Law Commission Year Book 1950 
(1957) 374 - 378. 
35 There was, however, a futile French proposal during the 1998 Rome Conference on the ICC which called for 
an inclusion of legal persons as well, see Art. 23(5)-(6) of the Draft Statute for the International Criminal 
Court, 1998, UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add.1. See Artcile 25 (3) of the ICC Statute which makes criminally 
responsible one who, “for the purpose of facilitating [...] aids and abets”. 
36
 M Kremnitzer calls for the inclusion of such responsibility in the ICC Statute “A Possible Case for Imposing 
Criminal Liability on Corporations in International Criminal Law” in 8 JICJ (2010) 918. 
37
 Ramasastry and R. Thompson (n 23). 
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4.  Corporate Civil Responsibility: US Corporate Human Rights Litigation as 
a possible alternative to corporate criminal accountability 
US human rights litigation against the individual and corporate human rights violator, aider 
and abettor of such violations as well as international terrorism, has developed effectively 
over the last 30 years. In 1980 the 2nd Circuit District Court heard the seminal Filartiga v 
Pena- Irala38 case, where acts of (state instigated) torture committed outside the territory of 
the USA and involving two non-US citizens as both victim and perpetrator, was brought as an 
action before US federal courts. The court established its jurisdiction in this instance based on 
the Alien Torts Claims Act (now being referred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)), a statute 
from 1789 which had hardly been used for nearly 220 years.39  
 
The scope of US human rights litigation is remarkably wide in the context of parties 
concerned. Individuals have the right to initiate legal actions against other individuals, 
judicial persons and in some instances, even states, as perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Human rights litigation under the ATS provides one of the few opportunities for natural 
persons as litigants to seek redress in a country other than the one where the violation has 
taken place. ATS adjudication40 includes actions against individual defendants, both as state41 
and non-state42 instigators of actionable human rights and terrorism torts43 and an increasing 
number of lawsuits against MNCs44 for their complicity in human rights atrocities committed 
by repressive regimes in developing countries, as well as their complicity in international 
terrorism.45 The scope of this paper warrants a discussion of the general features of US styled 
human rights litigation with a focus on terrorism litigation as developed by US adjudication.  
                                                           
38
  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).  
39
  The ATCA/ATS was only used on a few occasions prior to Filartiga. See Symposium on “Corporate liability 
for violations of international human rights law” in 114 Harvard Law Review (2001), 2033.  
40
  Human rights litigation in the USA is based mainly on the ATCA/ATS as the main jurisdictional statute. 
Consequently, the term “ATCA/ATS” refers to any action brought before US courts under these statutes. 
41
  Filartiga v Pena-Irala (n 38). 
42
  Kadic v Karadzic 70 F 3d 232 (2nd Cir 1995) for an adjudication of human rights atrocities committed during 
the Bosnian Yugoslav War of 1991 to 1995. 
43
  Such as terrorism, cf. Smith v Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 101 F 3d 239 (2d Cir 1996) for the 
terrorist Lockerbie bombing of 1988. 
44
  S.-D. Bachmann “Where do we stand with human rights litigation against corporations?”2 TSAR (2007), 
292-308; R Herz “The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Statute Advances Constructive Engagement” in 21 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2008), 208–239. 
45
  See H Strydom and S-D Bachmann “Civil liability of gross human rights violations” in 3 TSAR (2005) 448-
469 454-457 for an overview and The Independent “Shell on trial - Oil giant in the dock over 1995 murder of 
activist who opposed environmental degradation of Niger Delta”, retrievable at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/shell-on-trial-1690616.html 
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The last decade has seen a number of cases brought against corporate aiders and abettors of 
human rights violations.46 Such acts of corporate complicity included alleged collusion in a 
number of serious violations of international human rights law, including crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and torture as well as alleged violations of other human and 
fundamental rights as protected under various civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights treaties.47The case Doe I vs. Unocal48 concerned allegations of corporate complicity in 
forced labor and torture,49 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Company50 was based on the 
alleged involvement of the Royal Dutch/Shell oil group in human rights abuses in Nigeria, 
leading to the 1995 torture and murder of the environmental and community activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and, more recently, the allegations of corporate complicity in the commission of 
war crimes committed by Papua New Guinean Security Forces in Sarei v Rio Tinto.51 
 
Three particular cases are relevant in the context of corporate human rights litigation: the two 
Holocaust lawsuits and the still ongoing Apartheid lawsuit. In re Holocaust Victim Assets 
Litigation (Swiss Gold Bank case)52 nearly 900,000 victims and relatives filed a class action 
suit against the three largest Swiss banks in 1996, alleging that Swiss banks had breached 
international and national law by “knowingly retaining and concealing the assets of 
Holocaust victims, accepting and laundering illegally obtained Nazi loot and transacting in 
the profits of slave labour.” The case led to a $ 1.25 billion settlement in 1998. The second 
Holocaust case, the Nazi slave labour case, 53 was a class action against DAX-listed54 
German corporations for the use of forced ‘slave’ labour during World War II by defendant 
corporations and/or their legal predecessors. This highly politicised case ended with a 
settlement in 1999 when the defendant corporations and the German government agreed to 
establish a jointly funded $5 billion foundation for compensating the surviving victims of 
Nazi slave labour. The Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future’ was 
                                                           
46
  See Symposium (n 34) 2025- 2049; S.-D.  Bachmann (n 44) 292-296. 
47
  Symposium (n 39) at 2027. Herz (n 44). 
48
 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp (n 24). 
49
 The case was settled out of court in 2006, see press statement “Historic advance for universal human rights: 
Unocal to compensate Burmese villagers” retrievable at 
http://www.earthrights.org/news/press_unocal_settle.shtml 
50
 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 157 Oil & Gas Rep. 1, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,166 (2d Cir 
2000) (NO. 99-7223L, 99-7245XAP), the case was settled out of court in 2009 and The Independent “Shell on 
trial - Oil giant in the dock over 1995 murder of activist who opposed environmental degradation of Niger 
Delta”, retrievable at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/shell-on-trial-1690616.html 
51
 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007). 
52
 105 F Supp 2d 139 (EDNY 2000) 
53
 In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig (2000) 198 FRD 429 (DNJ) MDL No 1337 DNJ Lead 
Civ No 98-4104 (WGB). 
54
 DAX is the acronym for Deutsche Aktien Index where the major German (public) corporations are listed. 
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established in August 2000 by German parliamentary law55 for the compensation of victim 
groups in cooperation with Jewish support groups such as the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee (JDC). Such “historical justice claims”56 led to further –often 
unsuccessful – lawsuits, most notably the unsuccessful “Brooklyn slave labour case” In re 
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation57 and the still ongoing Apartheid58 lawsuit. 
In a “general” human rights torts ATS litigation against the corporate defendant, it has to be 
established that the alleged tort action falls under the “non-state actor” exception under the 
Kadic v Karadzic59 rule, whereas the MNC has committed the law of nations violation 
directly, thus overriding the state action requirement. In the case of liability based on the 
MNC’s complicity in acts committed by a foreign sovereign government, the plaintiff has to 
prove that the violation was caused by the MNC’s exercise of some form of control over the 
acting government’s officials or agents.60 Corporate action of “aiding and abetting” of the 
host state’s organs in the commission of the alleged human rights violations by financing and 
supporting such violations knowingly is sufficient for the purpose of such  litigation.61 This 
“control” requirement does not require the existence of actions falling under the strict 
“overall control”- and “effective control” test requirements under international law.62  
 
The case of Kiobel63 before the US Supreme Court threatens to limit severely the applicability 
of US judicial fora for acts of corporate complicity/ collusion in the commission of 
international crimes and human rights violations. This prospect resonates with US Chief 
Prosecutor’s Jackson statement before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 
whereas “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”64 Whether this will lead to a future exclusion of such lawsuits 
                                                           
55
 See the German Act Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung, Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft of 2 
August 2000 (Bundesgesetzblatt: BGBl 2000 I 1263). 
56
 B Stephens, (n 2) at 543 ff for an overview of related lawsuits within their topical context. 
57
 375 F.Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. III. 2005). 
58
 See the appeal case of In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 02 MDL 1499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) which 
continues the original unsuccessful 2004 lawsuit, In re South African Apartheid Litigation 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
59
 (n 42).  
60
  Symposium (n 39) 2039.  
61
  Wiwa, (n 50).  
62
  See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment Appeals Chamber (ICTY), 38 ILM 1518, 1549, outlining the 
“overall control” test requirements for the “internationalizing” of the Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995. The ICTY 
decision overcame the much stricter “effective control” test of the ICJ’s Nicaragua v. USA decision in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep 1986, 62 et seq. 
63
 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, (n 21). 
64
 IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946 in 22 IMT Trials 466, reprinted in 41 AJIL (1947) 172-221. 
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against corporate aiders who does not commit the crime/ tort itself will have to been seen. It 
would also affect the efficiency of any future US Anti Terrorism Litigation. 
 
5.  US Anti Terrorism Litigation 
5.1  Introduction and legal framework 
Lawsuits against corporate and state sponsors of terrorism can be brought under the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS),65 the subsequent Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),66 the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA)67 as amendment to the ATS, the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA Exception)68 and finally the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).69 
The ATS was enacted in 1789 as part of “alien law”70 and confers subject matter jurisdiction 
on an US federal court when: (1) an alien plaintiff sues, (2) for tort only (3) based on an act 
that was committed in violation of either the law of nations71 or a treaty of the US.72 The law 
of nations is defined by customary usage and clearly articulated principles of the international 
community. However, not all violations of international law are actionable under the ATS: 
only human rights violations of a high intensity are included. Over the last 25 years, US 
courts developed from the Filartiga judgment73 certain criteria as guidance for a possible 
violation of the law of nations (and as such actionable as ATS/ATCA torts). In Forti v. 
Suarez-Mason74 the “law of nation” test75 was developed, requiring a “universal, definable 
and obligatory”76 nature of the applicable international law nominations. A violation of 
international human rights and international humanitarian law may qualify as such a violation 
                                                           
65
  28 USC Section 1350 (also referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)) reads: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
66
  28 USC Section 1350. 
67
  18 USC Sections 2331-2338 
68
 28 USC Section 1605 (a) (7) which allows lawsuit against so called state sponsors of terrorism. 
69
 18 USC Section 1961 et sequ. 
70
 Law regulating the relations between and among non citizens towards each other. 
71
  In Kadic v. Karadzic (n 42) 239-41, the 2nd Circuit found that certain international crimes such as genocide 
resembled exceptions to that rule. 
72
  28 U.S.C. § 1350 reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”. 
73
  Filartiga defined torts actionable under the ATCA as “of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means 
of express in international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation 
within the meaning of the (ATCA) statute”, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala  (n 38) at 888. 
74
  672 F Supp (ND Cal 1987) 1531. 
75
  Which has become recognized as the so called Forti test. The US Supreme Court referred to this test in its 
Sosa v Alvarez-Machain decision of 29 June 2004, 124 S Ct 2739 (2004), Sosa hereafter. The Forti test consists 
actually of two parts, Forti I and II with the former outlining the requirements for the jus cogens nature of 
actionable torts and the latter defining the “universality” criteria thereof, see B Stephens (n 20) at 51-52. 
76
  672 F Supp (ND Cal 1987) 1539-1540. 
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of the law of nations when these specific criteria are met. The ‘alien’ defendant has to be 
present or otherwise represented in the USA when the summons is served.77 Today, the 
following human rights violations can be used to establish US federal jurisdiction: torture, 
summary execution or extrajudicial killing, genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, disappearances, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as 
well as international terrorism and hostage-taking.78 With the TVPA of 1991 the scope of 
human rights litigation in the USA is broadened by including acts of (state) torture and/or 
extra-judicial killings as actionable torts. Section 2 (a) TVPA states that “an individual who, 
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an 
individual to torture shall, in a civil action be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) 
subjects an individual to extra-judicial killing, shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to 
the individual’s legal representative, or any person who may be a claimant in an action for 
wrongful death”. The TVPA therefore also allows lawsuits for state-sponsored human rights 
violations of only mid-level intensity. 
  
In 1994 the US Congress approved the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)79 of 1992 which makes 
provisions for civil lawsuits by US citizens for injuries and losses incurred through an act of 
international terrorism. The ATA defines international terrorism in its section 2331 as 
     
“(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that-- 
  (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State, […] 
  (B) appear to be intended-- 
         (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
         (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
         (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or 
kidnapping; and 
  (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, […]” 
 
The Scope of the ATA is international in its scope, both in terms of the elements of the actus 
reus (A in conjunction with B (i-iii) ) as well as the scope of territorial applicability (C). It 
actually provides a more refined definition of terrorism than the (non binding) definition of 
                                                           
77
  The so called personal service requirement of summons etc. as stipulated in Fed.R.Civ.P 4 8(e) (2). 
78
  B Stephens (n 2) at 63 – 92. 
79
  18 U.S.C. Sections 2331-2339C, with the actual ATA comprising of sections 2332 to 2339C, excluding 
section 2332 a-h. The Act dates back to 1990, was dormant after a technical repeal in 1991 and was reenacted in 
1991 as part of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. See Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003, 106 Stat. 
4506, 4521-24 (1992). 
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the United Nations General Assembly (GA) definition of 1994, which describes terrorist acts 
as: 
 
“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provide a state or terror in the general public, a group 
of persons particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, 
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, 
or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”.80  
  
The ongoing work of the United Nations to draft a binding comprehensive Convention 
against terrorism,81 has seen a recent draft provision, wherein Article 2 (a) provides: “Any 
person commits an offense within the meaning of the present Convention if that person [...] 
causes: “Death or serious bodily injury [...] or (b) serious damage to public or private 
property [...] or damage to property, [...] when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature and 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government” to a particular action. If 
this Convention was to be adopted and to become part of international law, a civil action 
before a US Federal Court could be based on the ATS directly and not the ATS. An offence 
within the scope of the Convention would then constitute both, a ‘law of Nations violation” 
as well as a “violation of a treaty the US is party to”. The ATA essentially closes a judicial 
gap whereas acts of terrorism did not provide a cause of action under the ATS, which was 
highlighted in the Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic case of 1984.82  
The FSIA Exception came into force in 1996 and limits the applicability of the state 
immunity defence in cases of state sponsored terrorism. It can be regarded as a direct judicial 
response to the growing threat of international terrorism directed against the USA and its 
citizens.83 The FSIA Exception permits an action for damages against the state sponsor of 
international terrorism for personal injury or death caused by acts of torture, extra-judicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, or the provision of material support or resources for 
such an act. Such an act or the provision of support has to be by an official agent of the 
                                                           
80
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (1994) A/RES/49/60, Annex, para 3. 
81
 U.N. General Assembly Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism, Report of the 
Working Group, Sixth Committee, Un Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.28. The Committee plans to resume its meetings in 
2013 with no meetings planned for 2012. 
82
 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), concerning the murdering and wounding of over 100 victims by the PLO. 
83
 See e.g. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999) and for a general overview 
Lawsuits Against State Supporters of Terrorism: An Overview CRS Report for Congress, retrievable at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22094.pdf. 
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foreign state who is acting within the scope of his or her duties while committing the crime.84 
The FSIA Exception effectively amended the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)85 
to permit a civil suit against state sponsors of terrorism.86  
 
In 2001, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was amended to 
include actions against criminal groups that have engaged in a pattern of racketeering 
activity, including murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery and fraud, as well as acts of 
terrorism.87 Since 2001, RICO was so far unsuccessful as legal basis against alleged 
‘sponsors’ of international terrorism and al Qaeda.88 
 
In conclusion, US Anti Terrorism Litigation, based on the above legislation, can be invoked 
against basically three types of possible defendants. Firstly, the state sponsor of terrorism 
under the FSIA, the so called FSIA state defendant.89 Secondly, against the non FSIA state 
actor defendant, as an individual perpetrator or sponsor of terrorism who acts under the 
colour of law in terms of the Kadic - Karadzic rule and who does not fall under the protective 
scope of the FSIA.90 Lastly, the (pure) non FSIA non state actor who does not act under the 
colour of law nor  falls under the scope of FSIA and who basically commits or collaborates in 
acts of terrorism, as for example al Qaeda or Hamas. 91   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
84
  The FSIA Exception therefore amends the Foreign States Immunity Act  to permit a civil suit under the 
following requirements:  (1) The foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6 (j) 
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C § 2405 (j)(1994)) or section 620 (a) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994)) at the time of the commission of the act; (2) The act was 
committed within the designated state and there was a reasonable opportunity for the state to arbitrate the claim; 
or (3) The claimant was not a US national. 
85
  28 U. S. C. §§ 1602 – 1605.  
86
 Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria, see 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170260.htm (last visited 27-04-2012). 
87
 As amended under the 2001 PATRIOT ACT 
88
 Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 2005 WL 2086202 (E.D.Va. 2005), for alleged material support in Al Qaeda’s 
attack on the US warship Cole in Aden, Yemen waters in 2000, appealed  
89
 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, (n 83) Iranian Ministry of Information and Security-defendant’s daughter 
was killed while travelling in Israel by suicide bomber who had received support and training from agents of 
Iran. 
90
 Kadic v. Karadzic (n 42) Serb leader for his role in the Bosnian ethnic cleansing as a state actor of an 
unrecognized government 
91
 See the Boim litigation consisting of the cases Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute (n 6) (Boim I), Boim v Holy 
Land Found. for Relief  Dev., Nos.05-1815,05-1816,05-1821,05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007) (Boim II)and Boim III 549 
F.3d 685, 687 97th cir.2008) - US defendant’s son was killed in Israel by Hamas terrorists and the suit was 
directed against the alleged gunmen but also other – financial - supporters of Hamas. 
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5.2  The potential of US human rights litigation for combating terrorism 
Human rights litigation in the US has produced some examples of a successful adjudication92 
of human rights violations and has contributed to further legal development of the idea of 
human rights litigation as a separate notion of civil individual accountability. Prominent 
examples are the above discussed Holocaust lawsuits against Swiss banks and German 
corporations as well as the more recent Apartheid class action. These legal mass tort actions 
involved multi-billion dollar claims by thousands of individual victims for the alleged 
corporate complicity in mass human rights violations such as forced labour, the financing and 
exploitation of such activities, and/or as in the Swiss case the unjust enrichment of banking 
institutions as a result of human rights atrocities committed within the context of the 
Shoah/Holocaust. US human rights adjudication breaks with the traditional (albeit changing) 
view that claims directed against state officials for violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law can only be made at inter-state level93 and that such claims cannot be 
made by the individual victim in his/her own name. Outside the US, the absence of a 
Filartiga styled human rights litigation is apparent and unfortunate; thus limiting the further 
development of a universal civil jurisdiction of domestic courts.94 Nonetheless, civil actions 
in US human rights litigation have contributed to the recognition of international human 
rights law in other domestic court fora.95 Its overall impact on the protection of human rights 
can be best described with a dictum of the above Filartiga case: 
 
"[…] human rights litigation contributes to an important long-term objective: working 
toward a world in which those who commit gross violations of human rights are brought to 
justice swiftly, in whatever country they try to hide."96  
 
                                                           
92
  B Stephens (n 2), 239-245. The total of cases where US jurisdiction under the ATCA was granted and upheld 
in dozens of cases, see B Stephens, ‘Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush 
Administration’, 33 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 773, 813 (2008). See also Bachmann ‘Terrorism Litigation As 
Deterrence Under International Law – From Protecting  Human Rights to Countering Hybrid Threats’ in 87 
Amicus Curiae (2011) and Bachmann "Civil Liability of Corporate and Non-state Aiders and Abettors of 
International Terrorism as an evolving notion under International Law” Journal of International Commercial 
Law and Technology (JICLT 2011). 
93
  BGH – III ZR 245/98 (OLG Köln) concerning claims of Greek citizens whose relatives were murdered by 
German security forces in 1944. The growing number of human rights cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights resulting in financial compensation awards for the victim plaintiff does exemplify the above 
mentioned change of this traditional view.   
94
  Cf M Rau ‘Domestic adjudication of international human rights abuses and the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens’ in  61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2001) 177, 194. 
95
 Ibid and Ronald Grant Jones v The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya as Saudiya (The Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia) & Anor. in [2004] EWCA Civil 1394 et seq paras 61-68.  
96
 See the dictum Filartiga v Pena-Irala (n 38) at 890. 
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Corporate liability in anti terrorism litigation revolves around the question of corporate 
aiding, abetting and the overall facilitating of such terrorist activities. It always raises the 
question of what standard of liability should be applied. In the Arab Bank cases,97 it was 
alleged that such corporate participation took place by the provision of material support such 
as financial services, providing funds or collecting funds for different terrorist organizations 
operating in Israel such as terrorist groups such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.98  In the 
FSIA case of In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 200199 the court required that the 
defendant had aided and abetted if he has given “substantial assistance or encouragement to 
the primary wrongdoer”100   
 
In the context of combating international terrorism, the rationale and key features of US 
human rights styled litigation should be used and developed further into a possible global 
judicial deterrent. Corporate and individual sponsors of terrorist activities such as suicide 
bombings, extrajudicial killings and hostage taking are aiders and abettors of international 
terrorism who should be held accountable 
 
6.  Conclusion: Challenges and Outlook  
The overall impact of the ruling of the court a quo101 in the above Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum (currently before the US Supreme Court) for the future scope of “aiding and 
abetting” lawsuits for indirect corporate participation in the commission of breaches of 
international law will have to be seen. To what extent “donor liability” under the ATS and 
ATA for providing financial support to terrorist groups will become a recognized legal 
definition under US human rights litigation is also a question which remains open. 
 
US human rights litigation has the potential for significant economic consequences not only 
for the corporate defendant in question but also for the market economies depending on the 
company’s financial soundness: employment, tax revenues and corporate social responsibility 
projects are only some examples for such benefits under threat. The examples of the Swiss 
                                                           
97
 Oran Almog, et al., v Arab Bank, PLC (04-CV-5564(NG)(VVP), Gila Afriat-Kurtzer, et al., v Arab Bank, 
PLC (05-CV-0388(NG)(VVP) (Arab Bank hereafter) Linde v Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F Supp 2d571 (E.D.N.Y 
2005) and Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y 2007). 
98
 Ibid 
99
 349 F.Supp 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
100
 Ibid, at 798. 
101
 2d Circuit, Sept 17, 2010 (n 21). 
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Gold Bank case the Holocaust lawsuits and the still ongoing Apartheid lawsuit demonstrate 
the extent and impact such mass tort litigation has the potential to affect economical and 
political aspects of state sovereignty.102 Another observation relates to the impact such 
accountability initiatives may have in terms of ‘collateral damage’. The US Material Support 
Act, which criminalizes every material support to terrorist organizations or individuals or 
entities that might be associated to terrorism, may serve as an example hereof. As a 
consequence of this legislation, US based humanitarian relief efforts in the East African 
region came to a significant standstill for fear of criminal prosecutions for aiding and abetting 
of terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab. 
 
Another observation is linked to a possible selectiveness and bias of US ATS and ATA 
litigation in terms of plaintiff and defendant classes, which fail to include US and foreign 
parties equally. The failed attempts to adjudicate cases arising from the (alleged) illegality of 
Israeli settlements in the disputed areas103 by targeting corporate colluders seem to imply 
such a bias. Cases against such activities, following the rationale behind corporate support for 
illegal activities, as substantiated in the Apartheid lawsuits104 failed. One such example is the 
unsuccessful   Caterpillar105 case where corporate complicity in illegal settlement activity 
was regarded as collusion in breaches of international law. While the author does not regard 
the present situation in Israel/Palestine as comparable with South Africa’s Apartheid pre 1994 
it is left to the reader to contemplate whether such litigation could be useful in the future for 
any Israeli government to implement future policies of detente such as stopping certain 
                                                           
102
 The implications of the former two lawsuits were mostly political for the states in question: Switzerland and 
Germany faced significant negative publicity for their unwillingness to acknowledge their responsibility to 
acknowledge financial liability. The impact of the Apartheid lawsuit is more economical: heavy penalties will 
lead to a reduction of corporate wealth and consequently will have fiscal and social consequences for the market 
economies affected.  
103
 Occupied territories according to UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and referring to the Gaza 
Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. See also the Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of 9 July 2004, 
retrievable at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1677.pdf. 
104
 See G Harpaz “The Dispute over the Treatment of Products Exported to the European Union from the Golan 
Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip-The Limits of Power and the Limits of the Law" in 
(38/6) Journal of World Trade (2004) 1049-1058.  
105
 In Corrie et al v Caterpillar CV-05192-FDB, it was alleged that Caterpillar violated international and federal 
US law when exporting bulldozers to the Israeli Defence Forces despite the knowledge that those were to be 
used for demolitions in the controlled Palestinian territories (West Bank). One of the defendants, Corrie, an US 
peace activist was killed while demonstrating against such demolitions. While the case was dismissed in the US 
it was heard as a civil case before the District Court of Haifa (April 2011). Caterpillar discontinued exports to 
Israel while the trial was pending. 
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settlement activities which would otherwise be impossible and possibly – literally – suicidal 
for its promoters in the often volatile climate of Israeli politics.106  
 
One possible drawback of US styled transnational human rights litigation under the ATS is 
linked to the observation that most anti terrorism cases ended in settlement and congressional 
enforcement action – paired with the further complex problem of enforcing such US 
judgments against defendants “shielding” in non complying jurisdictions. Another 
observation relates to the nature of the actionable tort of international terrorism: the lack of an 
international binding definition of terrorism107 reduces the scope of ATS litigation to acts of 
terrorism as defined under domestic US law, the ATA, and consequently prevents such 
litigation from developing further into an effective preventive instrument for fighting 
international terrorism.  
 
In order to combat international terrorism effectively in the long term it is necessary to 
multiply the existing ways of anti terrorism strategies and means available and to opt for a 
holistic approach. One universal, multi-stakeholder and multi-modal response catalogue will 
have to combine elements of “hard” military security responses (including kinetic options) 
with the “sword approach” of international criminal prosecution and even civil anti terrorism  
litigation. The strong potential of an US - styled (and even based) corporate anti terrorism and 
human rights litigation should not be ignored – the challenge will be to maintain the 
momentum of such litigation, to discuss its possible value for an international concept of civil 
responsibility for human rights violations and related international torts and to develop it 
further. The drafting and introduction of a future draft convention for the adjudication of 
corporate complicity in international crimes such as terrorism and other hybrid threats would 
be beneficial108 and close the present accountability gap, the “legal black hole” of corporate 
responsibility for these international crimes, delicts respectively.  
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 Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination by an ultra orthodox Israeli as a consequence of his signing of the Oslo Peace 
Accords serves as a drastic example of such dynamics of Israeli politics. 
107
 See C Powell “Defining Terrorism: Why and How in N LaViolette and C Forcese (eds) The Human Rights of 
Anti-Terrorism Irwin Law Toronto (2008), 128 -164 for a general overview of the problems defining terrorism 
as an international legal concept thus harmonizing a multitude of existing domestic and international anti-
terrorism concepts and programmes.     
108
 cf S-D Bachmann Civil Responsibility for Gross Human Rights Violations – The Need For A Global 
Instrument (Pretoria University Press (PULP) 2008, at 51 – 82 where the features of such a future Convention 
on Corporate And Individual Civil Liability for Human Rights Violations and Terrorism are discussed. 
